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Prohibition of discrimination with respect to the right to pension,
regardless of citizenship (Ribac´ v. Slovenia)1
This report refers to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 5 December 2017.
The applicant, Arand¯el Ribac´, stated in his complaint that the refusal to grant him an old-age
pension because he did not hold Slovenian citizenship constituted discrimination on the grounds of
nationality, contrary to Article 14 of the Convention2 taken in conjunction with Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1.3
Factual state
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the SFRY) was a federal State composed of six
republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia.
Nationals of the SFRY had dual citizenship for internal purposes, that is to say they were citizens
of both the SFRY and one of the six republics. They had freedom of movement within the federal
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1. Application no. 57101/10).
2. Art. 14 of the Convention: ‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.’
3. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law
and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.’
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State and could register as permanent residents wherever they settled on its territory.4 The SFRY
had two pension systems – military and civil. The pension rights of military personnel were
regulated by and secured through the federal authorities. In particular, members of the Yugoslav
People’s Army (hereinafter the YPA), the armed forces of the SFRY, paid their contributions to
and received their pensions from a special military pension fund based in Belgrade (hereinafter the
YPA Fund). The YPA Fund paid pensions to military pensioners irrespective of where they
undertook military service or lived once retired. This was the only pension fund existing at federal
level. In parallel, each republic had in place its own pension legislation and a public pension fund
set up for the payment of civil pensions.
After Slovenia declared independence, it introduced a comprehensive regulatory framework for
the pension rights of former YPA military personnel, in most cases allowing for pensions to be paid
only to Slovenian nationals.5
The applicant was a citizen of the Republic of Serbia in the SFRY. Following its dissolution, he
retained citizenship of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He had been residing in Slovenia
since 1964 and had had permanent resident status since 1981. However, he became a citizen of
Slovenia only on 1 April 2003.
On 13 November 1991 the YPA Fund found the applicant to be entitled to an old-age pension
under the SFRY military rules as from 1 October 1991 with more than 41 pensionable years
together with a with bonus (benificirana doba) in the YPA. The applicant maintained that he had
only received his pension from the YPA Fund twice (in November 1991 and January 1992), when
he had personally gone to Belgrade to collect it.6 In the period from November 1998 to April 2003
the applicant had been denied an old-age pension on the grounds that he did not hold Slovenian
citizenship, which was one of the requirements under binding legal regulations.
Prohibition of discrimination regulated in Article 14 of the convention as a non-
independent basis for protection
The Court reiterated that Article 14 of the Convention complements the other substantive provi-
sions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence, since it has effect solely
in relation to ‘the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms’ safeguarded by those provisions. The
application of Article 14 does not necessarily presuppose the violation of one of the substantive
rights guaranteed by the Convention. It is necessary but it is also sufficient for the facts of the case
to fall ‘within the ambit’ of one or more of the Convention Articles.7 The Court emphasised that the
prohibition of discrimination in Article 14 thus extends beyond the enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms which the Convention and Protocols require each State to guarantee. It applies also to
those additional rights, falling within the general scope of any Convention Article, which the State
has voluntarily decided to provide.8
4. Ibid: [6].
5. Ibid: [9].
6. Ibid: [13].
7. See, among many other authorities, Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], no. 55707/00, § 74, ECHR 2009; and Lupeni Greek
Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], no. 76943/11, § 162, ECHR 2016 (extracts).
8. See Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, § 40, ECHR 2005 X; and
Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia [GC], nos. 60367/08 and 961/11, § 58, ECHR 2017.
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According to the Court’s established case law, the principles which apply generally in cases
concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 are equally relevant when it comes to welfare benefits.9
However, this Article does not guarantee the right to acquire property,10 nor does it guarantee, as
such, any right to a pension of a particular amount.11 Furthermore, it places no restriction on the
Contracting State’s freedom to decide whether or not to have in place any form of social security
scheme, or to choose the type or amount of benefits to provide under any such scheme. If, however,
a Contracting State has in force legislation providing for the payment as of right of a welfare
benefit – whether conditional on the prior payment of contributions or not – that legislation must be
regarded as generating a propriety interest falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for
persons satisfying its requirements.12
Based on available information, the Court decided that the applicant would have had a right,
enforceable under domestic law, unless the discriminating criterion comprised the requirement to
have Slovenian citizenship had been applied.13 As a result, the Court concluded that the applicant’s
pecuniary interest fell within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and the right to the peaceful
enjoyment of possessions which it safeguards.14
Limitations of the prohibition of discrimination with respect to access to social
security benefits
The Court reiterated that, although Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not comprise the right to
receive a social security payment of any kind, if a State does decide to create a benefit scheme, it
must do so in a manner which is compatible with Article 14 of the Convention.15 The Court stated
that, in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, Article 14 affords
protection against different treatment, without an objective and reasonable justification, of persons
in relevantly similar situations.16 For the purposes of Article 14, a difference of treatment is
discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification; in other words, if it does not
pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
means employed and the aim sought to be realised.17
In the judgment analysed below, the Court pointed out that the contracting States enjoy a certain
margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar
situations justify a difference in treatment.18 The scope of this margin will vary according to the
circumstances, the subject matter and the background. A wide margin is usually granted to a State
under the Convention when it comes to general measures of economic or social strategy.19 The
Court emphasised that, because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national
authorities are in principle better placed than an international judge to appreciate what is in the
9. See Andrejeva, cited above, §77, and more recently, Ruszkowska v. Poland, no. 6717/08, § 48, 1 July 2014
10. See Kopecky´ v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 35, ECHR 2004 IX.
11. See, for example, Be´la´ne´ Nagy v. Hungary [GC], no. 53080/13, § 84, ECHR 2016.
12. Ibid: [40].
13. Ibid: [42] - [44].
14. Ibid: [45].
15. Ibid: [51].
16. Ibid: [52].
17. See Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 42184/05, § 61, ECHR 2010.
18. See _Izzettin Dog˘an and Others v. Turkey [GC], no. 62649/10, § 156, ECHR 2016.
19. See British Gurkha Welfare Society and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 44818/11, § 62, 15 September 2016.
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public interest on social or economic grounds, and it generally accepts the legislature’s policy
choice unless it is ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation’.20 However, as a general rule, very
weighty reasons that could be put before the Court, as mentioned in ECHR decisions, could regard
a difference in treatment based exclusively on the grounds of nationality as compatible with the
Convention.21
As far as the burden of proof in respect of Article 14 of the Convention is concerned, the Court
has established that once the applicant has shown a difference in treatment it is for the government
to show that it was justified.22
Judgment
The Court decided that in this case there was a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in
conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
The main basis for this judgment was the determination that the applicant, when his pension
rights were determined in 1998, was in a relevantly similar situation to retired YPA military
personnel with Slovenian citizenship. This was supported by the following circumstances:
a) The applicant had lived in Slovenia since 1964, established a family life there and had been
registered as a permanent resident there since 1981.
b) The applicant, like other YPA military personnel, paid pension contributions to a federal
pension fund (the YPA Fund).
c) The applicant was entitled to a pension under the conditions set out in the SFRY military
rules, which applied to all beneficiaries regardless of their nationality.
d) In 1998 the applicant fulfilled all other statutory conditions entitling him to the pension
except holding Slovenian citizenship.23
e) There are not enough grounds to claim that the applicant, as a foreign national, could not be
compared to Slovenian nationals because he, unlike them, had been entitled to pension
rights in Serbia as well as under the YPA Fund.24
The Court did not find any grounds for stating that the difference in treatment was objective and
reasonably justified. Although the Court stated that the difference in the treatment complained of
pursued at least one legitimate aim that was broadly compatible with the general objectives of the
Convention, namely the protection and organisation of the country’s economic and social sys-
tem,25 it did not find any arguments that would allow it to consider the discrimination as justified
(as the government had argued) because, firstly, nationals of other former SFRY Republics were
assumed to have participated in aggression against Slovenia and secondly, their rights were the
subject of succession negotiations and there was therefore no reason for Slovenia to assume
responsibility pending the conclusion of a succession agreement.26
20. Ibid: [53].
21. See Gaygusuz v. Austria, 16 September 1996, § 42, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 IV; and Andrejeva, cited
above, § 87.
22. See D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325/00, § 177, ECHR 2007 IV.
23. Ibid: [55]-[57].
24. Ibid: [58]-[59].
25. Ibid: [61].
26. Ibid: [62]-[67].
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Final remarks
The judgment of the Court should be considered appropriate. Nationality cannot constitute a basis
for discrimination with respect to access to social security benefits, unless it was objectively and
reasonably justified. In the present case, no circumstances that justify derogation from the principle
of non-discrimination pursuant to Art. 14 of the Convention exist. It seems that the Court could
have included more detailed references to the arguments of the government in its judgment and
explained why it does not consider these arguments as convincing circumstances that might justify
different treatment of the applicant.
Protection against the reimbursement of improperly collected social
security benefits (Cˇakarevic´ v. Croatia)27
This review refers to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 26 April 2018. The
applicant, Ilinka Cˇakarevic´, stated in her complaint that the decision ordering her to return the
improperly paid unemployment benefits constituted a violation of her property rights28 and of the
right to respect the suspension of payment of her retirement pension during a period of employ-
ment in the public sector, as it constituted an unjustified interference with her property rights and
an infringement on her right to respect her private life.
Factual state
On 10 December 1995, the applicant was dismissed from work due to her incapacity for work
resulting from a prolonged illness. At that point in time, her period of employment as considered
for the purposes of the calculation of employment benefit was 24 years and 10 months.29
On 5 November 1996, the Regional Office of the Croatian Employment Bureau in Rijeka
(hereinafter: Rijeka Employment Bureau) granted the applicant unemployment benefit in Croation
Kuna (equivalent to about EUR 55) for a period of 468 days. Later, in June 199730 this benefit was
extended for an indefinite period of time. Additionally, in December of that year the Employment
Office added two years to the applicant’s period of employment (which did not mean two years of
performing work by the applicant, but only two years for the purposes of calculating the entitle-
ment to social security benefits).
In March 2001, the Rijeka Employment Bureau deprived the applicant of the right to unem-
ployment benefit, stating that the benefit had been granted in a manner not compliant with the law.
Pursuant to legal regulations, persons with a period of employment shorter than 25 years (i.e. a
group to which the applicant also belonged) were entitled to receive unemployment benefit for a
period not exceeding 12 months. Only persons who had been employed for more than 25 years
27. Application no. 48921/13 m 26.04.2018.
28. ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles
of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or
other contributions or penalties.’
29. Ibid: [6].
30. Ibid: [8].
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were entitled to receive such benefits until the point at which they found a job. The Employment
Office decided that the applicant had lost her right to sickness benefit on 9 July 1998. As a result,
she was asked to return the amount of benefit paid after that date. The applicant appealed against
the decision to the Administrative Court. The Court upheld the decision of the Office to revoke the
benefit, but pointed out that the return of improperly paid benefits by the Office should be pursued
in civil proceedings.31
As a result of the claim of the Rijeka Employment Bureau, in 2009, the Civil Court issued a
judgment, ordering the Applicant to return the total amount of the benefits paid after 9 July 1998
with interest.32
The concept of possession in the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights as a
basis for the protection of social security benefits
The applicant based her complaint on the violation of her property right, which is protected under
Article1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The basis was, however, contested by the govern-
ment. Evaluating the acceptability of the complaint, the Court analysed whether the unemployment
benefit that had been paid, which the government demanded that the applicant return, was covered
by the concept of possession developed on the basis of the aforementioned provision.
The Court pointed out that the concept of ‘possessions’ referred to in the first part of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 has an autonomous meaning which is not limited to the ownership of physical goods
and is independent of the formal classification in domestic law: certain other rights and interests
constituting assets can also be regarded as ‘property rights’, and thus as ‘possessions’ for the
purposes of this provision33 (see, among many authorities, Depalle v. France [GC], 2010).34 The
Court also emphasised that, although Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 applies only to a person’s existing
possessions and does not create a right to acquire property, in certain circumstances a ‘legitimate
expectation’ of obtaining an asset may also enjoy the protection of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.35 At
the same time, the Court made a reservation that the legitimate expectation must be of a nature
more concrete than a mere hope and be based on a legal provision or a legal act such as a judicial
decision. The mere fact that a property right is subject to revocation in certain circumstances does
not prevent it from being a ‘possession’ within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, at least
until it is revoked.36
The Court transposed the above considerations to the analysed case and emphasised that the key
issue for assuming that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable ratione materiae is to determine,
whether in the circumstances of the case in question, the applicant can be said to have had a
legitimate expectation, within the autonomous meaning of the Convention, of being able to retain
31. Ibid: [16]-[18].
32. This was a judgment of the Court of Appeal, which changed the judgment of the District Court that had held in favour
of the Applicant. Although the Applicant appealed against the decision of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court
and the Constitution Tribunal, her appeals were considered, respectively, as inadmissible and unfounded.
33. Ibid: [50], see also Iatridis v. Greece [GC], no. 31107/96, § 54, ECHR 1999-II.
34. Depalle v. France [GC], no. 34044/02, § 62, ECHR 2010.
35. Ibid: [51] see also Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, § 65, ECHR 2007-I; and Be´la´ne´ Nagy v.
Hungary [GC], no. 53080/13, § 74, ECHR 2016).
36. Ibid: [52] see Be´la´ne´ Nagy, cited above, § 75; Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, § 105, ECHR 2000 I; and Krstic´ v.
Serbia, no. 45394/06, § 83, 10 December 2013).
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the funds already received as unemployment benefit without her entitlement to those past dis-
bursements being called into question retrospectively.37
Assuming that such legitimate expectation existed, the Court provided five arguments support-
ing its position:
1) The applicant did not contribute to the error of the authorities that resulted in the payment
of unemployment benefit for a period longer than that permitted by domestic law.
2) The good faith in which the applicant accepted her right to the benefit throughout the
period when it was disbursed was never questioned.
3) The decision delivered to the applicant did not contain information that the benefit would
be paid only for a period of 12 months.
4) There was a long lapse of time, amounting to over three years, after the expiry of the
statutory time limit during which the authorities failed to react while continuing to make
the monthly payments.38
5) The nature of the unemployment benefit and the situation of the applicant when she was
receiving it justified her expectation that it was disbursed in compliance with the law.39
The concept of peaceful enjoyment of property as a basis for protection against
the obligation to return unduly paid benefits
The Court assumed that the benefit awarded as unemployment benefit was subject to protection
against the obligation to return the benefit paid, i.e. enjoyed the protection of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1. In consequence it was necessary to determine, whether the demand of authorities to return
these benefits could be considered as acceptable. In order to do so, the Court analysed the factual
state of the case in the light of three prerequisites:40 (i) whether that interference was prescribed by
law, (ii) whether it pursued a legitimate aim, and (iii) whether there was a reasonable relationship
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued.41
Whether the interference was based in law. The Court pointed out that the legal basis for the actions of
Romanian authorities was not completely clear. Although it was obvious that the Civil Court
ordering the applicant to return improperly received benefits relied on section 210 of the Civil
Obligations Act relating to unjust enrichment,42 it still did not give any explanation as to why
section 55 of the Employment Mediation and Unemployment Rights Act was not to be applied in
37. Ibid: [54].
38. Ibid [59]-[62].
39. Ibid: [64].
40. Ibid: [72].
41. See Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, §§ 147-151, ECHR 2004 V.
42. Section 210 of Civil Obligations Act (Zakon o obveznim odnosima, Official Gazette nos. 53/1991, 73/1991, 3/1994, 7/
1996 and 112/1999): ‘(1) When a part of the property of one person passes, by any means, into the property of another
person, and such a transfer has no basis in a legal transaction or law, the acquirer shall return that property. If this is not
possible, the acquirer shall provide compensation for the value of the benefit received. (2) The transfer of property also
includes any benefit obtained by someone performing an action. (3) The obligation to return the property or provide
compensation for its value shall arise even when something is received on account of a cause which did not exist or
which subsequently ceased to exist.’
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the applicant’s case since that rule appears to be a more specific one as regards the applicant’s
situation. That provision obliged an unemployed person granted an allowance to which he or she
had not been entitled to pay this back if it had been granted on the basis of false or inaccurate data
which he or she had known to be false or inaccurate, or if it had been granted in some other
unlawful manner.43 However, the Court decided not to rely on this basis in its judgment, stating
that the issue of assessing the proportionality of the interference was more important for the
ultimate result of the case.44
Whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim. The Court decided that the demand to return
unduly received benefits had a legitimate aim. It pointed out that such action is justified by the
protection of public interest by means of correcting an erroneous decision of the authorities.45
Whether the interference was proportionate. The Court stated that in order to determine whether the
principle of proportionality had been complied with, it was, first of all, necessary to assess whether
the balance between protecting the public interest and the right of the applicant to protect her right
to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions was maintained. Secondly, it was necessary to
determine whether the decision of authorities imposed a disproportionate and excessive burden
on the applicant.46
First of all, the Court emphasised that national authorities are fully entitled to correct a decision
that mistakenly granted a specific allowance to a citizen. This is justified, among others, by the
principle of legality. However, as mentioned in the jurisdiction of the ECHR multiple times,47
correcting erroneous decisions should in principle not be remedied at the expense of the individual
concerned, especially where no other conflicting private interest is at stake.48
The Court emphasised that one should consider the fact that:49
a) Where an issue in the general interest is at stake, it is incumbent on the public authorities to
act in good time, in an appropriate and consistent manner.50
43. Section 55 of the Employment Mediation and Unemployment Rights Act (Zakon o posredovanju pri zaposˇljavanju i
pravima za vrijeme nezaposlenosti, Official Gazette no. 32/2002): ‘(1) An unemployed person granted an allowance to
which he or she was not entitled . . . shall pay this back if: 1) [all or part of the allowance was] granted on the basis of
false or inaccurate data which he or she knew or ought to have known to be false or inaccurate, or [granted] in some
other unlawful manner; 2) He or she was granted an allowance because he or she failed to report a change affecting [his
or her entitlement] or the scope of the entitlement, and he or she knew or ought to have known about this change. . . . ’
44. Ibid: [75].
45. Ibid: [76]: ‘(1) An unemployed person granted an allowance to which he or she was not entitled . . . shall pay this back
if: 1) [all or part of the allowance was] granted on the basis of false or inaccurate data which he or she knew or ought to
have known to be false or inaccurate, or [granted] in some other unlawful manner; 2) He or she was granted an
allowance because he or she failed to report a change affecting [his or her entitlement] or the scope of the entitlement,
and he or she knew or ought to have known about this change. . . . ’
46. Ibid: [77].
47. See, mutatis mutandis, Platakou v. Greece, no. 38460/97, § 39, ECHR 2001 I; Radchikov v. Russia, no. 65582/01, § 50,
24 May 2007; Freitag v. Germany, no. 71440/01, §§ 37-42, 19 July 2007; Gashi, cited above, § 40; and Sˇimecki v.
Croatia, no. 15253/10, § 46, 30 April 2014.
48. Ibid: [80].
49. Ibid: [79]-[81].
50. See Tunnel Report Limited v. France, no. 27940/07, § 39, 18 November 2010; and Zolotas v. Greece (no. 2), no. 66610/
09, § 42, ECHR 2013.
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b) The Convention is intended to safeguard rights that are ‘practical and effective’.51
c) It must look behind appearances and investigate the realities of the situation complained.52
d) Uncertainty – be it legislative, administrative or arising from practices applied by the
authorities – is a factor to be taken into account in assessing the State’s conduct.
The Court decided that ordering the applicant to return the total overpaid amount was an
excessive individual burden for her.53 This determination was based, first of all, on the behaviour
of the authorities and of the applicant herself. The Court stated that, although section 25 of the
Employment Act clearly provides that someone employed for less than 25 years has the right to
unemployment benefit in respect of a temporary incapacity to work, for a maximum period of 12
months, the decision issued to the applicant did not contain any express mention of that time-limit,
and the applicant was thus not put on notice of it. Moreover, given that two additional years of
service had been added to the applicant’s employment record it appears that she, as an unqualified
worker, was not without grounds for believing that she met the requirements that entitled her to
receive the benefit for a period exceeding 12 months.54 The Court also stated that, considering the
fact that the benefit had been paid for nearly three years after the expiry of the statutory period in
which the applicant was legally entitled to receive it, it should be considered that the authorities
failed in their duty to act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner.55
The Court did not find any fault on part of the actions of the applicant. Moreover, it pointed out
that, even though the unemployment benefit payments which the applicant should not have
received were entirely the result of an error of the State, the applicant was ordered to repay the
overpaid amount in full, together with statutory interest. Therefore, no responsibility of the State
for creating the situation at issue was established, and the State avoided any consequences of its
own error. The whole burden was placed on the applicant alone.
Judgment
As a result of the above considerations, the Court concluded that the actions of the authorities were
not of a proportional nature, and thus that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
to the Convention. The Court did not assess the charge of violation of Art. 8 (having considered
that it is, to a significant extent, similar to the charge raised in the light of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention).
Final remarks
The judgment of the Court should be considered appropriate. The Court stated very precisely why,
in the case in question, the State could not demand the return of improperly paid social security
benefits (unemployment benefits in this case). Not only does the judgment extend the concept of
peaceful enjoyment of property developed by the Court in the light of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to
51. See also Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 100, ECHR 1999-III.
52. See Broniowski, cited above, § 151; Hutten-Czapska v. Poland [GC], no. 35014/97, § 168, ECHR 2006 VIII; and
Zammit and Attard Cassar v. Malta, no. 1046/12, § 57, 30 July 2015.
53. Ibid: [90].
54. Ibid: [83].
55. Ibid: [84].
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the Convention, but it also constitutes an important element of strengthening the protection against
charging citizens with the burden of errors made by administrative authorities.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Wujczyk 293
